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LAW AND MORALITY. By Leon Petrazycki. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 1955. Pp. xlvi, 335. $7.50. 
"The content of traditional legal science is tantamount to an optical 
illusion: it does not see legal phenomena where they actually occur .... "1 
Professor Petrazycki in this initial English translation of two of his works 
first published in 1905 and 1907 offers a profound and modem analysis 
of the nature of law designed to eliminate this illusion. Petrazycki rejects 
traditional definitions which seek to find law in objective rules of reason, 
the commands of the state, the general will, etc.-that is, in a world ex-
ternal to the individual. He directs his analysis to the subject experiencing 
1 PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 8 (1955). 
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the legal phenomena, finding the sphere of law in the mind of the indi-
vidual. As defined by Petrazycki, law is a psychological experience of an 
individual who, reacting to a given set of facts, senses an obligation owed 
another which is to be performed in a prescribed manner and a corres-
ponding right attributed to that person to receive the called-for perform-
ance.2 These "ideas" of right and duty establish legal norms for the 
given individual. Petrazycki recognizes that these norms may be influenced, 
for example, by a statute governing the situation. But the statute is only 
a "normative fact," part of the external data to which the mind of the 
individual actually experiencing the legal relationship may consciously or 
unconsciously refer. 
In order to establish the psychological foundation for his theory of 
law Petrazycki introduces the concept of an "impulsion," i.e., a bilateral 
passive-active experience, such as hunger, :which consists of an awareness 
of a given situation and an incitement to action in accordance with that 
cognition. Petrazycki is primarily concerned with the more abstract and 
general impulsion, duty. An impulsion is a moral one if. this duty (or 
"imperative") is the only factor present in the psychological experience. 
It is legal if there is an attributive aspect allied with the imperative; if 
there is not only an obligation felt (to give Smith ten dollars) but a right 
to have the obligation performed which is ascribed to the subject of the 
legal relationship (Smith should receive ten dollars, having rendered 
valuable services). Two important points deserve notice with respect to 
such an analysis. First, the distinction between law and morality is founded 
solely upon the content of the impulsion and an experience may be either 
one or both, depending upon whether an attributive aspect is or is not 
present in the psychologic experience. Second, the scope of law is ex-
tremely broad under Petrazycki's definition since the psychic experience 
at its foundation does not postulate social or political constraint and 
does not require a human being as the subject of an attributed legal right. 
Petrazycki's theory must be distinguished from such "psychological 
approaches" to the law as those of Jerome Frank and Ranyard West, which 
are in reality concerned only with normative facts. Both Frank, in his 
psychological interpretations of judicial reasoning,8 and West, in his use 
of law as ancillary to the individual's psychological control of anti-social 
tendencies,4 conceive of law as something external to, and determinative 
of, the individual's psychic experience. More closely akin to Petrazycki's 
theory are the views represented by Gurvitch and Olivecrona. Gurvitch 
adopts the imperative-attributive concept but holds that it "implies that 
2 For excellent analyses of Petrazycki's legal theory see Babb, "Petrazhitskii: Theory 
of Law," 18 BOST. UNIV. L. REv. 511 at 513-518 (1938) and SOROKIN, CoNTEMPORARY 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES 700-706 (1928). 
3 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 100-117 (1930). 
4 West, "A Psychological Theory of Law," !NTERPRETA'l10NS OF MODERN LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 784 (1947). 
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all law rests on collective experience and presupposes an authority not 
identical with the rules themselves. Only by a collective recognition of 
social facts which realize values, is it possible to establish a close inter-
connection between claims and duties."5 Olivecrona recognizes that legal 
relationships are merely "conceptions in human minds"6 but, unlike Petra-
zycki and Gurvitch, views them as shaped by the "regular use of force."7 
The deficiency of both analyses is that in attempting to formulate pri-
marily a theory of the determinants of the legal experience they unneces-
sarily restrict the scope of the experience itself. Petrazycki, on the other 
hand, is concerned with an empirical analysis of the legal mentality. A 
legal relationship conceived between Indian and idol is as revealing of 
the psychic experience of law as one between Mrs. Palsgraf and the Long 
Island Railroad. 
One of the most important aspects of Petrazycki's psychological theory 
is its interpretation of law's inter-relationship with the individual and 
society. Petrazycki makes an extensive analysis of: (a) law's functions in 
distributing social benefits and organizing an authoritative system for 
securing the enjoyment of those benefits, and (b) law's motivational and 
educative effect on individual and group behavior. But unfortunately he 
d~votes only a few pages to the influence of group and individual be-
havior on law. Petrazycki never definitively analyzes the determinants 
of law since he leaves the question of what is the nature of the "impul-
sions" unanswered. These impulsions cannot be equated with instincts-
"definite stimulus-response processes or actions which are inherited"8-since 
Bernard has established that habits rather than instincts are the major 
determinants of the individual's psychologic pattern. Purposive or hedo-
nistic foundations should also be rejected.9 Petrazycki seems to realize 
that the legal mentality must be a function of the educative effects of 
society, environment, etc., but he leaves the subject to a future analysis. 
As a concomitant of Petrazycki's failure to analyze the determinants of 
law, his pervading interest in the form of the legal experience and neglect 
of its content subjects his theory to another important criticism. Petra-
zycki supplies merely a mental structure adaptable to a wide range of 
substantive norms and he formulates no objective standards for evaluat-
ing the content of the legal experience.10 
This review has attempted to offer only a hint of the scope of Petra-
zycki's legal theory. As a concluding evaluation of this most recent addi-
5 GURVITCH, SocIOLOGY OF LAw 57 (1942) (italics added). 
6 OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 77 (1939). 
7Id. at 169. 
8 BERNARD, INSTINCT: A STUDY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 509 (1924). See pp. 509-534 
for Bernard's analysis of instincts and habits. 
9 PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 31 (1955). 
10 For a similar criticism of the legal theories of Neo-Kantism and Neo-Hegelianism, 
see liALLoWELL, MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN POLITICAL THEORY 358 (1950). 
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tion to The 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, Pound's more general 
appraisal seems appropriate: "His chief contributions, for the purposes 
of jurisprudence, seem to be: his reference of both law and morals to 
psychology, distinguishing intuitive morals and law from positive morals 
and law; his study of the process of human motivation; his theory of the 
creation of positive morality and positive law through unification of 
habits of conduct; and his psychological theory of alternating change and 
stability."11 
William R. ]entes, S. Ed. 
11 Pound, "Fifty Yeats of Jurisprudence," 51 HARv. L. R.Ev. 777 at 809 (1938). 
